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The 1980s have witnessed a nationwide movement to upgrade public education, including
reform efforts in the New England states. Massachusetts periodically has grappled with
the challenge ofimproving its schools. During the 1960s, the Massachusetts legislature
authorized a thorough examination ofeducation in the state. This mandate was carried out
by a blue-ribbon panel that came to be known popularly as the Willis-Harrington Commis-
sion. In 1965, the commission issued a 624-pagefinal report that includedfindings and
recommendations relating to many aspects ofpublic education in the state. This article
chronicles the history of Willis-Harrington and discusses the problems that thwarted im-
plementation ofmany ofthe wide-ranging changes it envisioned.
Between 1962 and 1965, the Massachusetts Education Study, known popularly as the
Willis-Harrington Commission, undertook a major examination of public education
in the state. In September 1961 , Senate president Maurice A. Donahue filed the enabling
legislation that created the commission. The legislation was enacted in February 1962,
and the appointments to the commission were completed by the following September.
Beginning in the spring of 1963, the commission spent thirty months and $300,000 to
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the state's school system. In December 1964, the
commission issued its summary report; in October 1965, it published its findings in a
624-page final report that included more than one hundred programmatic recommenda-
tions.
1 "The General Court [the state legislature] would have been hard put to have passed
a broader or more far-reaching resolve," observed an early staff working paper prepared
for the commission. 2
Despite the extensive effort and general optimism that characterized the Willis-Harring-
ton Commission through the mid-1960s, and despite the support it received during this
period both from elected officials and the media, the major difference in Massachusetts
public education after the commission had finished its work was a reorganization of the
board structure that governed the public schools. The commission did not succeed in
making the new governing boards powerful enough to effect its programmatic goals, and
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education policy as reflected in the classrooms of the Commonwealth was virtually un-
changed. The question that arises from any study of this effort is, Why was the change
brought about by Willis-Harrington much less substantive than the reformers had in-
tended?
This article will begin with a discussion of the circumstances that led to Willis-Harring-
ton, then will go on to describe the commission's composition and the conclusions it
reached. The commission focused most of its attention on the areas of elementary and
secondary school reform, and the article will further consider the reasons that many of the
changes the commission proposed in these areas were never implemented.
The Mess in Bay State Education
Massachusetts in 1962 was ripe for an extensive evaluation of public education. Its popu-
lation of 5, 149,00 3 included a million children of school age, 98 percent of whom at-
tended secondary or elementary institutions. 4 Because of the baby boom, enrollment in
the state's school systems was rising at a rate of 30,000 pupils a year, and parents, particu-
larly those who lived in the suburbs, were becoming increasingly concerned about the
quality of education their children were receiving. 5 The rapidly growing suburbs were a
major constituency for education reform during the period. 6
A 1962 report prepared by Harvard economist Charles S. Benson for the New England
School Development Council asserted that standards in more than 40 percent of the state's
public schools were below the national average. Additionally, Benson found that in com-
parison to the nation as a whole, 40 percent of all Massachusetts communities spent less
on education; 41 percent had higher student-teacher ratios; the credentials of many Mas-
sachusetts teachers were not as good as those of their out-of-state colleagues; and
60 percent of the state's communities paid less than the yearly national average of $5,135
per instructional staff member. Some feared that the economic expansion of the 1960s
would lure college graduates away from teaching, toward a more lucrative profession,
thus further depleting the pool of potential teachers.
7 The Commonwealth's state aid for-
mula, which made no correlation between state aid and local need, was "hopelessly out-
moded," the report said. 8
In and of themselves, however, deficiencies in the education system do not lead to re-
form. In September 1961 , a series of Boston Globe articles entitled "The Mess in Bay
State Education" documented the problems of public school education in the Common-
wealth and called for action to remedy these ills. 9 Having brought the subject into full
public view, the articles may have served as a catalyst for the formation of Willis-Har-
rington. They pointed to insufficient state aid; a school aid distribution formula that was
sixteen years out of date; education whose quality was based on "the accident of geo-
graphic location"; and a weak Department of Education. Since the state was covering
only 16 percent of the costs of local education, there was an inordinate reliance on the
property tax to provide quality education. 10 Further, as a result of using 1945 property
valuations as the basis for determining school aid, towns like Wilmington, with less need,
were receiving $55 per pupil, while cities like Lawrence, with more serious educational
problems, were receiving only $36 for each student." Unless this situation changed, the
series argued, the Commonwealth's municipalities would continue to offer two standards
of education: one where property values were high, another where they were low; and
education, especially in the cities, would suffer. Under this double-standard system,
420,000 city schoolchildren in Massachusetts were assigned second-class status. 12
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Nor did the shortcomings in the public school system end at the high school graduation
ceremony, according to the Globe series. Asserting that "public education in this state is
at its worst at the college level," 13 the authors pointed to the same lack of coordination for
college resources which characterized kindergarten through high school. In short, they
said, "public higher education is not really 'a system' but a tangled historic legacy still
without an overall plan." 14 The absence of direction and coordination meant that schools
were left to fight with each other over state resources that the University of Massachusetts
historically had controlled, and still did. 15
The Globe articles did not hesitate to assign blame for these problems. The efforts of
the state Department of Education were "inadequate." The situation was so bad that edu-
cators were going to the state's private colleges, not to the Department of Education, to
learn the current thinking on educational issues. 16 There were no state standards for cur-
ricula, no programs for career upgrading of teaching skills, and no overall state plan for
achieving and maintaining quality education for all Massachusetts residents. The articles
traced the beginnings of this inaction to the 1930s, when "the Department of Education
became just another haven for political appointees"; now, in the early 1960s, an often self-
serving "old-boy" network was still in place. 17 Education commissioner Owen Kiernan
was criticized for a lack of leadership, especially concerning curriculum reform and over-
all coordination. Finally, the articles attributed part of the "mess" in education to a situa-
tion of long standing: there had been no statewide review of schooling for well over a
hundred years, since Horace Mann's term as secretary of the Massachusetts Board of
Education.
The Commission
The mandate of the Willis-Harrington Commission went beyond that of any other educa-
tion study in the history of the state: it was all-encompassing, involving an analysis of
every aspect of public learning in Massachusetts. The enabling legislation stated that an
"unpaid special commission" was established "for the purpose of making an investigation
and study of the laws of the commonwealth pertaining to education, of the educational
institutions of the commonwealth and their organization, of the various school systems
therein, and of the educational laws, programs and school systems of other states." The
study was to be undertaken "with a view to
elevating educational standards in the commonwealth, reorganizing the scope of the
various educational boards and administrators of the commonwealth, revising and
modernizing the organizational and financial structure of schools and school systems,
extending the facilities, curricula, and educational goals of the schools and colleges of
the commonwealth, and providing increased financial aid for education. 18
A major strength of Willis-Harrington was its reliance on a blue-ribbon panel to analyze
education policy in Massachusetts. Seven members from the House and three from the
Senate were included, as well as eleven distinguished citizens, among them business lead-
ers and school and college administrators. 19
Senate Education Committee chairman Kevin Harrington (D-Salem), who was on his
way to becoming one of the most powerful members of the Senate, became chairman of
the commission. House Education Committee chairman Thomas Wojtkowski became the
commission's vice-chairman. Together, Harrington and Wojtkowski created a group that
was comprised mainly of nonpoliticians, an unusual situation in the annals of Massachu-
68
setts education reform efforts. 20
Harrington had had lifelong interests in history, government, and education, and, as a
former teacher and one who had depended on scholarship aid for his college education, he
had a firsthand appreciation of the value of learning. His interest in the improvement of
education was no doubt genuine, as was his belief that the commission could be success-
ful. He was also politically ambitious. As one of the rising leaders in Massachusetts gov-
ernment, he was to be appointed majority leader in 1964 and elected Senate president in
1970. Harrington believed that pulling together a constituency for substantive education
reform would enhance his chances of moving up the political ladder. Voters in the 1960s
were concerned about education, and they would give special consideration to a young
politician who cared about the schools.
Benjamin Willis was not a voting member of the commission but, as its executive direc-
tor, was charged with overseeing its day-to-day operations. Willis had presided over the
resurrection of the Chicago school system. As superintendent of Chicago schools, he was
well-known for his capacity to analyze problems, develop solutions, and drive his staff
toward implementing those solutions. 21 He was highly regarded in education circles of the
early 1960s, and his appointment brought a certain star quality to the commission. Har-
rington and Wojtkowski no doubt believed that the prestige and interest generated by Wil-
lis's appointment would help further the commission's work. Willis's credentials were so
impressive that he was chosen as executive director even though he retained his job as
Chicago school superintendent. 22
Beginning in the spring of 1963, six full-time and seven part-time researchers were
hired. They analyzed public education in Massachusetts, collecting data and developing
position papers on a wide variety of topics ranging from school curricula to public fund-
ing mechanisms for education. John L. Steele, former superintendent of the U.S. Army
Dependents' Schools in Europe, was the staff director. Examination of the material gener-
ated by the researchers indicates the high level of organization Steele brought to the ef-
fort—organization that was critical to the success of the commission's research phase.
Steele also stood in for Willis during the week, when the executive director was in
Chicago. Staff people attended over sixty commission meetings and designed and imple-
mented a major survey on the logistics of learning (class size, condition of buildings,
curriculum, textbooks, support services) which more than two hundred school superin-
tendents filled out and returned.
Findings
The activity of Willis-Harrington was divided into three distinct phases. The sixty-seven-
page summary report, with capsule programmatic recommendations, appeared first;
legislation to reorganize the Board of Education was filed at the same time. In the spring
of 1965, the legislature debated the merits of the reform legislation, on the basis of infor-
mation contained in the summary report; the new board reorganization was signed into
law in June 1965. The massive 624-page final report embraced the recommendations
contained in the summary report but provided more detailed information about the condi-
tion of the state's public education. The final report also offered explicit recommenda-
tions that addressed the problems identified in the summary report.
The findings outlined in the final report would not surprise a student of Massachusetts
education history. They included the following:
• There was a great disparity in the amount of money spent on education
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among the school districts, partly because the state underfunded its school
aid formula by 50 percent. 23
• Some systems were deficient in curricula offered and in the length of time
required to be spent in academic study. Only 40 percent of the state's high
schools offered their pupils state-of-the-art physics courses, and only 29
percent provided instruction in contemporary calculus. 24
• The state's contribution for local education costs was lower than that of
forty-two other states. 25
• The Board of Education and the Department of Education were "primarily
advisory" and lacked almost every resource necessary for enforcing mini-
mum school standards. 26
• No statewide means existed for measuring school performance. 27
• The quality of textbooks and school libraries varied widely among dis-
tricts.
28
• Special and vocational education programs were not meeting the needs of
students.
29
• The public higher education system was ill-prepared to meet either the
immediate needs of the growing population of college-age students or the
long-range needs of the Massachusetts economy. 30
The report went beyond listing these individual findings, many of which had been set
forth in previous studies. 31 Over fifty pages were devoted to a consideration of the special
problems of certain school populations, including minorities, the handicapped, and stu-
dents who did not speak English. In the education system, black citizens were dispropor-
tionately the victims of poverty. They "were forced to live by themselves" in cities where
quality public education was not in evidence. And, in keeping with its overall thrust, the
report stated that learning would help disadvantaged citizens move up the social and eco-
nomic ladders upon which Americans placed so much stock. 32
The report gravely concluded that many of the state's local school districts were prov-
ing shortsighted in their treatment of education, which they viewed as merely a budget
item, not as a "gilt-edge investment" in a better future. 33 Despite the benefits of good
education for all, "the bulk of the Commonwealth's cities and towns put into schooling
what money they could afford to spend, not what they could afford to invest." 34 This cir-
cumstance was a fundamental concern of the report: "It matters vitally to every individual
where the accident of birth and home locates him. And the very fact that it does should
matter more than anything else in Massachusetts." 35
Major Recommendation
The commission's key proposal was to reorganize the existing Board of Education into
two distinct entities, a Board of Public School Education and a Board of Higher Educa-
tion. These new governing units were to be filled by appointees who were not educators—
a clear repudiation of the old Board of Education, which had been staffed exclusively by
school professionals.
The old Board of Education had assumed responsibility for elementary, secondary, and
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postsecondary schools, but the two new boards were to divide responsibility. The Board
of Public School Education would govern kindergarten through high school; the second
board would administer higher education.
The Board ofPublic School Education. Once the old Board of Education had been dis-
solved as part of the June 1965 legislation, the new structure became known by the same
name. The new BOE was composed of outstanding Massachusetts citizens who were to
be in charge of setting education policy for the elementary and secondary schools. All
aspects of learning at these levels, including education of the handicapped, special needs,
and vocational training, were within the purview of the BOE. Before the reorganization,
separate divisions in the Department of Education had set policy in these areas, often
without considering how the plans of a particular division would fit into the state's overall
education system. The broadening of power in the new BOE, then, was expected to bring
greater efficiency to the setting of education policy.
The BOE that was created by the 1965 law was given new statutory powers, including
the authority to set minimum educational standards for all courses; fix maximum pupil-
teacher ratios; evaluate the state school-aid formula and recommend changes; and with-
hold state and federal funds from school committees that failed to comply with laws or
regulations that it promulgated. The BOE chairman was the chief spokesman for school
improvement; he and his board would work with the legislature to secure the funds needed
to carry out specific programs. In short, the new Board of Education was to be the vehicle
for implementing the commission's programmatic reforms.
The Board ofHigher Education. This body was created to bring order and organization
to the state's system of postsecondary institutions. It was to determine the location and
mission of new institutions, allocate resources effectively, and set program priorities. It
was also to act as a buffer between the institutions and the legislature, determine the fund-
ing levels for individual campuses, and oversee the expansion of the state's public higher
education system.
The previous Board of Education had been given little in the way of support staff. To
remedy this ill, the new governance boards were to be supported by a nongoverning re-
search arm, the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education (MACE). While not a
policy-making unit per se, MACE would act as a standing committee on educational mat-
ters, with the professional demeanor and research capabilities to monitor the education
process in Massachusetts. It would also screen candidates for gubernatorial appointment
to the new BOE and the BHE.
The Commission 's Price Tag
The commission diffused much of the potential argument against the cost of the reform by
not incorporating programmatic recommendations in the legislative package that was
signed into law in June 1965. The final report detailed 111 suggestions for improvement,
but only those which the new boards authorized would be pursued. With two boards in-
stead of one, administrative costs would increase by several hundreds of thousands of
dollars, but that was the probable extent of immediate increased costs. The price tag
seemed acceptable for the benefits that would be delivered. A few critics, such as Rep.
Joseph Brett (D-Quincy)—a commission member—and Sen. William Wall (D-Lawrence)
voiced concern about cost, but there was little concerted objection regarding the commis-
sion's likely effect on the taxpayer. 36
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Legislative Proposals
Legislation reorganizing the governance of public education was filed in December 1964,
coincident with the release of the summary report. The reaction was largely positive. The
state's legislative leadership was solidly behind the study and was committed to passing its
major recommendation. There was little immediate public opposition to the new educa-
tion governance boards and remarkably little initial opposition to the extensive program-
matic agenda of the commission. In fact, in 1965, optimism abounded concerning the
commission's proposals. The media (especially the Boston Globe, which was establishing
itself as the up-and-coming paper of the decade) were highly supportive, as were most
educators. (A notable exception to this favorable response was Owen Kiernan, who was
commissioner of the Board of Education that preceded Willis-Harrington—and no rela-
tive of Rep. Cornelius Kiernan, another critic.) 37 In the mid-1960s, teachers' unions were
not major players in the formulation of public policy, so their voices were generally absent
from the commentary on Willis-Harrington. 38
Yet, from today's perspective, it would seem that the commission's ambitions exceeded
its grasp of political reality. Reading through the 624-page final report, with its detailed
analyses and recommendations, gives the reader a sense that, if only because of sheer
volume, this education manifesto could never have been realized. Very probably, in the
latter part of the 1980s, any knowledgeable observer of the history of education in the
Commonwealth—a history based on almost autonomous local control of the schools and a
traditionally weak state Department of Education—would view the commission's agenda
with serious skepticism. Clearly, there was a contradiction between the commission's
expectations and what it could realistically hope to accomplish.
The difficulty the commission experienced in motivating the political and civic cultures
to implement its agenda can be attributed to five major factors. These include the shifting
of the social agenda; the legacy of strong local control of schools in Massachusetts; the
failure of the state to earmark money to implement the commission's recommendations;
weaknesses in leadership; and traditional legislative prerogatives.
The Shifting of the Agenda
The explanation of the contradiction between the goals of the commission and its accom-
plishments lies partly in the more general historical context. The years 1962 and 1963
were heady times in Massachusetts and in the nation. Unemployment and inflation were
under control, and personal income was rising steadily. 39 John F. Kennedy's administra-
tion had stirred much hope. The pragmatic rationalism that characterized the president's
tenure held that with the right kind of research, planning, and commitment, anything
could be accomplished. 40 The United States was a solid contender in the space race, and
the president had pledged to land an American on the moon before the decade's end.
Education had been a major issue in Kennedy's campaign platform, and he had made
comprehensive education reform one of his legislative goals. 41
Massachusetts was experiencing good times. A son of the Bay State was in the White
House. Thirty thousand children a year were entering the state's school system. If the
United States was on its way to the moon, Massachusetts could certainly be on its way to
providing educational excellence for all. Kevin Harrington, Benjamin Willis, and their
allies could reasonably believe that the state would be the driving force that would ensure
this excellence.
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However, both the state and the nation changed dramatically between 1962 and the time
when the new Board of Education became fully operational, in 1967. Just as the commis-
sion was beginning to develop its research, John F. Kennedy was assassinated, an event
that dampened the kind of idealism in which Willis-Harrington was conceived. Part of
Lyndon Johnson's legacy included the Great Society, which sent billions of federal dollars
to the states to combat poverty and improve education. By the mid-1960s, the arena for
social progress and improvement of schools had shifted dramatically— to Washington,
away from state and local government. The year 1965 brought race riots to some cities and
an escalation of the war in Vietnam, while less attention was paid to state education initia-
tives.
As the decade wore on in Massachusetts, improvement of schools lost its urgent status
on the state agenda. Tens of thousands of baby boomers swelled college enrollments,
indicating that elementary and secondary education were doing a good job with the Com-
monwealth's children. Feared shortages in teachers never materialized, and new schools
were built to remedy the double-shift school days of the early decade.
The same legislative session that had passed the Willis-Harrington reorganization legis-
lation had also passed the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Bill, and how to educate mi-
norities better became the lead school issue. Martin Luther King's march on Washington
in 1963, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Watts riots and the Selma march
of 1965, and the numerous race riots of 1966 and 1967 all helped create a heightened
national awareness of racial inequality. In Massachusetts in 1965, political leaders passed
a progressive racial imbalance law that was designed to desegregate public schools. 42 One
of the ironies of this era is that actions aimed at promoting racial equality essentially con-
signed to the back burner efforts to improve public education.
Problems related to desegregation interfered with the new BOE's ability to implement
Willis-Harrington's master plan. Two months after passage of the commission's legis-
lative package, the legislature enacted the Racial Imbalance Law. For Willis-Harrington
supporters, it was an unfortunate coincidence that two of the most important education
bills in the state's history became law in the same session. Owing to the preoccupation
with redressing racial imbalance in some urban systems (Boston and Springfield primar-
ily), less energy was focused on the general quality of education in the late 1960s. A con-
tent analysis of the newspapers of the period shows that more than 80 percent of the
reportage on education dealt with issues of racial balance. 43 Even allowing for press bias,
that figure is a telling indicator.
From the beginning, Harrington had insisted that the commission consider the problem
of segregation in the public schools.
44 From its inception, however, the new BOE was
consumed with trying to redress the racial imbalance without offending any constituency.
By 1967, given the overriding racial issue and start-up problems that still persisted, the
BOE could find little time to work on the more general problems of public education in
Massachusetts. 45 By 1973, the board was still being criticized for neglecting the needs of
white parents because of its preoccupation with the Racial Imbalance Law. 46
What was believed probable in 1962, with respect to the Willis-Harrington agenda,
seemed impossible five years later.
The Tenacity of Local Control
Local control of education, which is a strong national tradition, is very pronounced in
Massachusetts. Among the industrial states, Massachusetts may be the most locally ori-
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ented concerning education. 47 Historically, it has paid a relatively low percentage of the
cost of education. In the absence of substantial state aid, support of schools becomes
largely a local responsibility, and the corollary is local control. Massachusetts has few
state-imposed course requirements (just four years of physical education and one year of
history) and no state standards for graduation from high school. Those who would reform
education in the Bay State, then, have always searched for some way to do so without
offending the sensibilities of municipalities.
Early statutes helped establish the preeminence of the locality in matters of education,
and a glance backward to the formative days of Massachusetts can help explain the devel-
opment of municipal power. The Puritans who settled communities like Dedham—whose
roots have been researched at length—had rigid, hierarchical concepts of religion and
government— indeed, of life generally. Outsiders were not welcome, and each newly
established town was expected to be largely self-sufficient. Calvinist theology taught that
any failure to succeed indicated a spiritual flaw, so there was little likelihood that a com-
munity would admit to any problems and ask others for help, no matter how badly needed
that help might be. Such a request would have been tantamount to admitting a weakness of
faith, an admission that people were loath to make. 48
Even as the state's towns and cities evolved, the belief in self-sufficiency remained
powerful. The early settlers had left England to escape the intrusion of central power into
their lives, an intrusion that forbade their religious practices. Subsequent generations of
New Englanders prided themselves on their independence from government. When public
education came to the state, control was kept at the municipal level through the powerful
force of tradition. The early Board of Education could only suggest policy to local sys-
tems, so success "depended less on the pleasure of the legislature in session than on the
persuasiveness of the Secretary sitting down with local school committees." 49 As Willis-
Harrington's participants discovered, the hold of local control was still very firm.
The new BOE did not make substantive recommendations affecting local districts until
November 1967, fully seventeen months after its creation. In a move designed to make
public education more efficient, the board issued guidelines for reducing the number of
school districts in the state from 390 to 250. At the same time, it recommended a teacher-
student ratio of 1 to 25 for elementary school and 1 to 16.7 for high school. 50
Once the new governing body had actually set forth substantive recommendations,
resistance developed rapidly. Criticism was levied at the commission for having presented
proposals in the absence of any cost projections. Further, the findings of the commission
which justified these recommendations had not been adequately publicized, especially
with respect to the school districts that would implement them. Local school personnel
felt they had not been given an adequate opportunity to provide input. The Boston Herald,
the establishment newspaper of the period, was particularly concerned about the new
BOE 's actions:
Even the most progressive school committeemen tend to be bewildered when the
board takes two of the most important reform actions in the history of Massachusetts
education in the same day, and then provides few hard facts as to how these reforms
may be implemented. 51
Officials in forty communities were petitioning the legislature in protest of another com-
mission recommendation, one mandating that kindergarten be available in all districts. 52
The negative response by school districts to these initial programmatic recommendations
indicated that implementing any major reforms would be difficult.
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Willis-Harrington did not aim to set up a rigid, centralized school system. 53 In his
speech before the 1965 Tufts Assembly, commission member Franklin Patterson reas-
sured local officials that the new system would not mandate programs, but merely "set up
a floor beneath which educational services cannot fall." 54 Those associated with Willis-
Harrington continually asserted that the recommendations would not change the power of
the local school board to control education. The commission maintained that districts
would be required merely to meet certain minimums, yet for a school system that would
have to increase its number of teachers by 15 percent or budget in kindergarten facilities,
this was a tall order that threatened its sacrosanct autonomy.
The new boards of education were intended as vehicles to shape education policy and
bring more state resources into the classroom. Clearly, this constituted a shifting of
power. Though the commission as a whole tried to understate the impact its agenda would
have on local control—and probably believed that the impact could be absorbed— local
districts, feeling that changes were being imposed upon them and that they were not in-
cluded as partners in the process, were predisposed to reject the agenda. The commis-
sion's selection of understatement as a strategy was ultimately perceived by local school
districts as a kind of deliberate betrayal.
Failure to Earmark State Aid
More than 90 percent of the commission's final report was devoted to identifying specific
problems in the schools and suggesting solutions. Such suggestions included hiring more
teachers to lower the student-teacher ratio, upgrading the quality and currency of text-
books, improving the physical plants of schools, and doubling state aid to local school
districts. Willis-Harrington itself estimated the total cost of putting its new programs in
place at $123 million, 55 while Rep. Cornelius Kiernan argued that the cost would exceed
$215 million. 56
If the state was to obtain more control over local education, Massachusetts political
leaders would have to appropriate more money to implement the new board's agenda.
The legislation for a sales tax that was supported by Governor Volpe passed in November
1967. While there was clearly no quid pro quo linking the levy to Willis-Harrington, the
tax was on the public policy agenda during the mid-1960s, and this was seen by some as
an indication that it could be used as a funding mechanism for education reform. The
governor had referred to the sales levy as an "education tax." But there was a general
consensus that in the absence of strong leadership from the BOE, any new state revenues
would be used to reduce real estate taxes or expand other local services besides education. 57
Since state education aid was not earmarked for education, increased local aid would
not necessarily go to the schools. After the state sales tax was voted into law, local aid
increased, but many districts did not apply the new revenue toward education expenses.
Even after Willis-Harrington's work and the creation of the new boards, there was no
major institutionalized increase in the percentage share that the state contributed for local
education. 58
Local autonomy was a determining factor here as well. Municipalities want to retain
control over their budgets, including whatever state revenues they receive. Further, the
new BOE had not yet developed a strong presence with the state's educational and politi-
cal institutions by the time the new sales tax was in place. A third problem was the steady
stream of federal dollars that came into Massachusetts and other states during the middle
and late 1960s. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) targeted
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federal aid to poor children and brought tens of millions of dollars of federal money into
the Commonwealth in the second half of the decade. With this federal largesse in hand,
there was less incentive for political leaders to consider earmarking more state education
aid.
59
In its second year of operation, the BOE was unable to move the political process to
dedicate new revenue toward some of the more basic Willis-Harrington recommendations.
The Problem of Leadership
The major leadership problem faced by the new boards may have revolved around the
people that Governor Volpe appointed to oversee education in the state. Though solidly
respected in their own fields, the appointees had little or no experience in public educa-
tion or in Massachusetts political life. Their lack of exposure to the realities of Massachu-
setts politics proved to be a serious obstacle as they attempted to overcome the tenacity of
local control and other institutionalized resistance to educational change.
The BOE Chairman
The chairman of the new Board of Education was William G. Saltonstall, a former princi-
pal of Exeter Academy and past head of the Peace Corps in Nigeria. Contemporaries of
Saltonstall generally had nothing but praise for his integrity and sincerity, but he seemed
to lack a realistic appreciation of the political process required to improve the state's
public education, and this proved detrimental in three significant areas: the board's rela-
tionship with the state legislators; its attitude toward publicizing and marketing its pro-
posals; and its estimation of local control as a counterforce to its own power.
During an interview in July 1966, Saltonstall reported that the BOE had not yet had
time to meet with the state legislators and build a foundation of trust. At the same time, he
complained that progress was slow because all personnel recommendations had to be
cleared through the legislature's Ways and Means Committee. 61 Yet six months had passed
since Governor Volpe 's appointments, and during this time, board members had failed to
connect with the legislators in charge of funding and personnel oversight. Saltonstall was
discouraged about the lack of progress and about the unwillingness of the legislature to
trust and consult with the board he headed. 62
With respect to the issue of local autonomy, Saltonstall believed that "the mandated
power of the board recommending directly to school districts" would be enough to ensure
change. He also thought that local school committees, superintendents, and principals
were "enthusiastic" about the Willis-Harrington study and "eager to see [the BOE] as-
sume its authority." 63 By 1967, the board's initial recommendations had been publicized,
but the times had changed and they were met with a negative response. Saltonstall' s ap-
parent naivete about local control may have led him to underestimate the importance of a
marketing strategy for the board's proposals. In any case, when he was confronted with
the observation that during its first year of existence the board had not developed a posi-
tive image, he replied that he did not consider developing public relations to be part of his
job.
64 This attitude reflected perhaps the ultimate failure of leadership among the ranks of
Willis-Harrington advocates: they did not understand that marketing their recommenda-
tions was a critical first step toward bringing about change. The following year, in Novem-
ber 1967, the board's recommendation to decrease the student-teacher ratio was attacked
at least in part because local districts had not been adequately informed about the proposal.
The message had to be delivered to the public that costly changes in the state's educa-
tion system would be beneficial, if not essential, to the continued prosperity of the Com-
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monwealth. In the absence of a major effort to focus public opinion, the new BOE was
unable to develop the broad backing that its systemic education reforms required.
The BOE Commissioner
Owen Kiernan's job as commissioner of the prior Board of Education had been eliminated
in the reorganization, but when the votes were counted, he was the commissioner of the
new board. This was curious, in that Mr. Kiernan clearly was not comfortable with the
conclusions of Willis-Harrington. The 1961 Globe series had leveled its charges primarily
at Kiernan and his bureaucracy, and much of the evidence for the series had been provided
by the commission. In December 1964, when the summary report was issued, Commis-
sioner Kiernan had been openly skeptical about the possibility of implementing the
study's objectives and had criticized its recommendation to eliminate the old Board of
Education, calling the idea "indefensible." 65 Commission vice-chairman Wojtkowski
described Kiernan as a "survivor" who, while having little use for Willis-Harrington,
would not jeopardize his tenure by being too critical of the effort viewed by many as the
state's most significant attempt to improve education. 60
Owen Kiernan generally supported the idea of Massachusetts education reform. His
chief objection to Willis-Harrington was that it infringed on the legislative prerogative, 67
and to anyone who had followed the progress of the study, this reservation was puzzling.
The object of this reform effort, in the words of Thomas Wojtkowski, was to keep the state
legislature from being a "school committee of the whole" for the state. 68 The two new
boards were to be given enough power in the political process to make substantive im-
provements in Massachusetts education, and the new structure would ensure that public
school policy would be based more on rational education theory than on politically driven
considerations. Kiernan was in some agreement with the ends but not with the means.
With the clarity of hindsight, it seems absurd that a major critic of the Willis-Harring-
ton recommendations would be chosen to lead the drive to implement them. In April
1967, the Globe noted that many observers, surprised when Kiernan was kept on, felt that
"past weaknesses of the Department would not find correction under past leadership." 69
The Board ofHigher Education
As with the new BOE, start-up problems sapped the energy of the Board of Higher Educa-
tion. The search that resulted in the decision to hire Chancellor Winthrop Dakin, a re-
spected Amherst attorney, took over a year. The actual governance of public higher
education in Massachusetts was just as disjointed with this new board in place as it had
been before, and by the mid-1970s Kevin Harrington and other political leaders were
looking to replace the BHE. 70
Perhaps the biggest problem for the BHE was that the established institutions of higher
education—the University of Massachusetts, Lowell Tech, and Southeastern Massachu-
setts Technological Institute in particular— still had powerful allies on Beacon Hill. An-
other problem was that the new board had to compete with five already existing boards of
trustees who oversaw the segments of public higher education (the community colleges,
state colleges, the technical institutions, and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst)
in setting policy. The new board's leadership could not overcome the politics of long-
established relationships between legislators and lobbyists, and so was unable to fulfill the
hopes of its sponsors, who had sought to create a strong, independent body. 71
Like other states in the nation, Massachusetts experienced dramatic growth in public
higher education facilities in the 1960s; the baby boom had increased the demand for
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higher education. The BHE was rarely a major player in this dynamic. Just as they had
before the BHE's creation in 1965, the legislature and the campuses determined policy
and building priorities. 72
The Governor
Historically, the decentralized character of state government in Massachusetts has pre-
cluded the development of a powerful governor's office. Until 1966, possibly because of a
colonial aversion to a strong executive, Massachusetts governors served two-year terms.
As a result, they generally spent the second year running for reelection rather than work-
ing on policy issues. 73 Between the end of World War II and the enactment in 1966 of the
law setting a four-year term, voters never kept a governor of the same party in office for
more than four years, so the executive had little opportunity to exert partisan political
power. 74 Thus, the office occupied by John Volpe from 1965 until 1969 was relatively
weak.
Governor Volpe did not stand directly in the way of implementing the Willis-Harrington
agenda, but his support was tempered by his concern about its cost. Commenting on the
summary report issued in December 1964, he referred to the plan's price tag as "hardly a
Christmas present." 75 When the reorganization legislation was signed in June 1965, he
said the job was only half done and reiterated the need to infuse millions of dollars into
education to make the new governance machinery function well. 76
Like most people, Governor Volpe believed that the improvement of public education
was a worthy goal, but he did not make increased funding for local education one of his
priorities. In January 1966, he wrongly asserted that "the state was providing one hun-
dred million dollars in additional revenue over and above existing programs to our cities
and towns for the support of local public elementary and secondary education as recom-
mended in the Harrington-Willis Study Commission Report." 77 The governor may have
been anticipating that the legislature would include this money in the FY 1967 budget, but
that did not happen. Since he was relatively restrained in his reaction to Willis-Harrington,
and since his office lacked the clout we have come to expect from contemporary governors,
Volpe 's capacity to help realize the goals of the commission was rather limited.
The Majority Leader
From 1962 to 1965, Kevin Harrington was the chief spokesman for the commission's
work, and throughout the effort his enthusiasm and commitment were obvious. Yet even
Harrington grew frustrated with repeated efforts to persuade the legislature and the pub-
lic to make the necessary choices—especially in terms of spending money.
During 1966 and 1967, as Harrington began to doubt the new system's capacity to
implement the educational master plan, his enthusiasm waned. In much of the post- 1965
coverage of the commission's aftermath, his voice was conspicuously absent. When he
was cited, he was frequently critical of the performance of the new boards. In October
1966, Harrington noted a growing belief on Beacon Hill that the new BOE had failed to
create the necessary "groundswell of public support" for increased aid to public educa-
tion.
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Several months later, he said that "the legislature has failed to develop respect
for the new boards of education. Neither the boards' recommendations for programs
nor requests for appropriations have been heeded." 79 He was as critical of the educa-
tional culture of the state, with its resistance to change, as he was of the new governance
structure.
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Harrington also was concerned about his own political agenda. Since no new constitu-
ency had developed around the commission's proposals, he could not afford to make the
improvement of local schools his priority. He had been appointed Senate majority leader
in 1964. With the road to the Senate presidency apparently ahead of him, developing the
external constituency needed to implement the plan he helped craft became less important.
The Legislative Prerogative
For many years prior to 1965, the legislature had been a major force in Massachusetts
public education. Although the old Board of Education was reputed to be independent, the
commission pointed to the absence of a strong, central policy-making body in the education
system which was not subject to control by the highly politicized legislature. In theory,
making education less of a political football made good sense, but it was unlikely that the
Massachusetts legislature would readily give up the control it maintained over public
schooling.
According to commission vice-chairman Thomas Wojtkowski, changes made by the
Ways and Means Committee to the reform legislation weakened the new structure and
helped ensure the legislature's continued involvement in education. These included alter-
ing some of the language of the legislation and limiting the salaries of the new boards'
leadership. The salaries of the BOE commissioner and the BHE chancellor were reduced
from $35,000 to $30,000, and, more important, the stipends were made subject to appro-
priation.
80 With relatively low salaries locked in place, the new boards would have diffi-
culty hiring top-flight administrators, and the committee removed one of the board's
independent powers by making salaries contingent upon appropriation.
More significant was the alteration of language. The commission's proposal in Decem-
ber 1964 called for the BOE to "approve all plans for public school education." 81 After the
bill had moved through the legislative process, the new law said the BOE "shall develop
plans for education to meet state needs," with no mention of any power to approve activi-
ties of local districts. 82 Thus the power of the new structure to initiate or direct was greatly
curtailed, and its role was reduced to an advisory one.
While the legislative leadership (Kevin Harrington, Maurice Donahue, and House
Speaker John Davoren) had consistently trumpeted the work of Willis-Harrington, the
floor fight on the commission's proposal revealed that many legislators had reservations
about the reorganization. Several amendments to weaken the proposed BOE by splitting
off vocational education and special education gained solid support before being defeated.
The key vote came on an amendment to reject the commission's bill entirely and modify
the current Department of Education by adding a separate division for special needs edu-
cation. That failed by only eight votes, 1 10 to 102. A shift of five votes would have scut-
tled the commission's key recommendation to establish an all-powerful board to run
public education. 83
Although legislative leadership and the Willis-Harrington Commission agreed that
change was needed, the legislature as a body was more cautious. After all the research
and writing had been completed, lawmakers still were reluctant to yield their power over
local education to a new bureaucracy. Individual members had more routine contact with
local school districts than did their leaders or the commission's members, a fact that may
have contributed to the legislature's unwillingness to accept fully the education proposal.
In the spring of 1967, criticism was leveled at the legislature for undercutting the power of
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the new boards and obstructing the boards' requests for appropriations. 84 This should not
have been surprising; many members of the House and Senate were not comfortable with
creating the strong boards envisioned by the commission.
Evaluation
Where does Willis-Harrington fit in the hierarchy of Massachusetts education reform
efforts? In a narrow sense, it did not do what it set out to do. The new Board of Education
never became the powerful initiator of school policy that the commission had intended it
to be. Twenty years after Willis-Harrington, a management study on the board and the
Department of Education concluded that the BOE should "take steps to assert leadership,
clarify its governance role, and promote a consistent approach to carrying out its mis-
sion." The study went on to recommend that the board develop a coherent statement of
mission. 85
Most of the final report's major programmatic recommendations were not implemented:
• The aid formula for state reimbursement of local education was not fully
funded and would not be until 1978, when another legislative commission
worked to enact a short-lived progressive funding formula that was under-
cut by Proposition 2 Vi , 86
Willis-Harrington did not persuade the Commonwealth's political leaders
to fund 40 percent of local education costs in order to decrease reliance on
the property tax to pay for the schools. Thus, the commission was not able
to equalize per-pupil expenditures among the poorer and wealthier cities
and towns. In fact, by 1969, fully four years after Willis-Harrington had
been released, the disparity in educational expenditures had widened, and
by 1978 the gap was even worse. 87
New state revenues were not earmarked specifically for local elementary
and secondary education costs. The hope was that with the appropriate
leadership from the reconstituted BOE, local governments would use new
revenues for education reform without the need for earmarking, a con-
straint that municipalities vigorously oppose. In the final analysis, the
legacy of local control took on the coloration of a moral imperative when-
ever the new board structure attempted to assert independent leadership.
Statewide measures were not imposed to assess school performance. (They
were established much later, with the passage of Chapter 188 of the Acts of
1985.)
The disparity between the resources and offerings of poor (usually urban)
and wealthy school districts remained intact. Today, student performance
among these districts is increasingly divergent, particularly with respect to
minority students. 88
The overall student-teacher ratio has declined dramatically since the mid-
1960s, but the decline is due primarily to the appearance of bilingual and
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special needs teachers, who often serve small classrooms. There certainly
has not been the sort of increase in state funding that would permit districts
to hire enough teachers to lower the ratio for general education. 89
Given these programmatic shortfalls, it is clear that the structural changes signed into
law in June 1965 did not transform the Massachusetts Board of Education into the equiva-
lent of a powerful body like the New York Board of Regents. Yet, in a historical context,
the impact of the Willis-Harrington Commission exceeded that of any of the one hundred
or so other education reform efforts that preceded or followed it.
Certainly the largest effort in terms of scope, budget, and time frame, the commission
did much to improve public education in Massachusetts. By opening up membership in
the boards of education to lay people, it moved those structures away from a closed, club-
bish atmosphere. And it did focus the media's and the public's attention on the schools
during the mid-1960s.
In light of the BHE's ineffectiveness (it was dissolved in 1980), it is ironic that Willis-
Harrington is remembered by many for what it did to promote public higher education. In
the words of Joseph Cronin, former state secretary of educational affairs, Willis-Harrington
"liberated the state colleges" and helped increase the likelihood that a Massachusetts high
school graduate could go on to public higher education. 90
Willis-Harrington helped expand the state's higher education by publicizing the educa-
tion system and by splitting off governance of postsecondary learning from that of general
education. The previous Board of Education had often sought to advance personal gain at
the expense of institutional growth. The new, independent governance provided an in-
creased sense of legitimacy and credibility to the state's colleges and universities as a sep-
arate piece of the educational landscape. The commission's work also helped publicize the
range of offerings of the state system. In the early 1970s, community colleges became an
important part of public higher education, in part because of the commission's conclusion
that expanded educational opportunities were important to the future growth of the state.
Willis-Harrington slightly increased the amount of money that state reimbursed locali-
ties. In what is one of the ironies of tax-policy development in Massachusetts, the com-
mission probably helped bring about the imposition of the Massachusetts sales tax. Un-
fortunately for the commission's advocates, the tax was passed too late to infuse money
into the BOE's education proposals. The perception that much of the new revenue would
be used to pay for education reform probably made it much easier to sell the tax to the
legislature and to the public. 91 Although most of the new money was not used to improve
schools, the sales tax, which many would argue is an essential general revenue enchance-
ment device for Massachusetts, is still in effect today, and the commission can be credited
at least in part with its passage.
The commission's greatest contribution, however, is an intangible: although it was
unable to implement its ambitious agenda, it helped set the context for many reforms that
followed. In the twenty years since Willis-Harrington, the state local aid formula has been
made more progressive; special needs students have been given the opportunity to receive
a quality public education; numerous school buildings have been upgraded and replaced;
bilingual education has become a reality; and teacher certification has been modernized.
All these reforms were suggested in the commission's final report, and it is reasonable to
assume that they were easier to implement because of Willis-Harrington's clarion call for
reform. Proponents of those efforts are in some large measure indebted to the efforts of
the Willis-Harrington Commission for their later successes.
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Conclusion
The experience of the Willis-Harrington Commission illustrates the essential ambivalence
that attends education reform efforts in Massachusetts. On the one hand, leaders call for
change; more than one hundred education studies have been authorized with education
reform in mind. 92 On the other hand, many people feel that local autonomy is a critical
value that should not be assaulted. Civic and political leaders see a need for improving
many of the state's school systems in the important areas of curriculum, teaching, and
basic skills; but many resent the state telling local districts to make changes in these areas.
Sometimes we clamor for more state education aid. At other times we rue the day the state
became involved in local education at all.
Twenty years after the commission went out of business, much of its agenda is still the
subject of reform activities. Educators and politicians are concerned about the disparity in
the caliber of education offered in the local districts; of particular concern are the high
dropout rates and the poor test results that attend urban systems. 93 Equalizing educational
opportunity is a worthy goal, but one that seems to elude us.
Those who work to improve the schools must pay attention to past efforts to advance
education. Without an external constituency for change, good ideas will remain theoreti-
cal. Willis-Harrington demonstrated that doing just about everything right in the research
and legislative phases of school improvement efforts is probably not enough to promote
constructive change. The commission's agenda was thwarted by the old—the strong tradi-
tion of local control—and by the new—the ascendance of other priorities.
In summarizing the frustrations of the Willis-Harrington effort, Kevin Harrington said
much about the process of Massachusetts education reform:
We enacted what we wanted to enact. We ripped layers of skin off the old system, but
in a few years, the education establishment came right back in. 94
Harrington's observation points out the essential problem for those who would try to
reform education. Being given the legal sanction to make decisions about education policy
is not equivalent to having the power to change anything. In order to bring change to the
system, reformers must realize that power is perhaps 20 percent granted and 80 percent
taken. New laws replaced the old Board of Education with two new boards, but the foun-
dation needed to capture the attention of the public and the political culture—a necessary
step for those who wish to wield power in a representative democracy—was never laid.
Not understanding the enormity of their task, the leaders of the new governance structure
were unable to change the face of Massachusetts public education.
Perhaps more than anything else, the history of the Willis-Harrington Commission
demonstrates that those who wish to reform education in Massachusetts must recognize
the difficulty of changing the basic relationship between weak, centralized state power
and autonomous local control. The Willis-Harrington researchers felt encouraged by the
knowledge that Massachusetts cared enough about education to have authorized so many
studies. Perhaps that piece of history should have been taken as a warning that in Massa-
chusetts we prefer to initiate reform studies instead of improving education. The state's
penchant for studying rather than reforming public education made the commission's task
very difficult, and its successes quite impressive. *t>
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participants. Fortunately, the work of the commission is well documented, both in terms of legislative
materials and staff working papers and newspaper accounts, most of which are available at the
Massachusetts State Library, State House, Boston.
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